Power is often misunderstood as authority. In practice, it is shaped by process, institutions, and the limits of execution.
Few careers illuminate this more clearly than that of Hon. David Pratt, Former Canadian Defence Minister. Over more than three decades, he has moved through elected office, cabinet government, humanitarian institutions, and strategic advisory work, operating both inside and outside formal power.
In this wide-ranging conversation, with Danish Shaikh, Editor, The International Wire. Hon. David Pratt reflects on how democratic systems actually function; why accountability feels different inside government than outside it; and what clients, officials, and citizens frequently underestimate about decision-making. He offers a sober assessment of Canada’s defence readiness, the persistent gap between ambition and procurement reality, and the constraints middle powers face in pursuing strategic autonomy.
The interview also revisits democratic capacity-building under extreme conditions, drawing on his work with the Iraqi Parliament, and examines why humanitarian principles such as neutrality and independence remain difficult to sustain in an era of renewed hard power. His experience with the Canadian Red Cross provides a rare insider view of the misunderstood relationship between humanitarian institutions and the state.
Rather than nostalgia for past office, this is a practical examination of governance under strain, how power is exercised with care, where institutions falter, and what credibility requires when expectations exceed capacity.
From Public Office to Strategic Advisory
You have moved between elected office, humanitarian institutions, and private advisory work. What perspective does this breadth give you on how power actually functions in democratic systems?
In Canada, I believe there is a genuine attempt these days to exercise power in a responsible fashion; that is to take into account the views of many different and sometimes conflicting interests in order to reach decisions that move the country forward. Part of the reason for this is that we have a vibrant civil society, a free media and institutional mechanisms such as parliamentary committees to that provide important inputs to public policy. The short answer is that power is generally exercised in this country with care and sensitivity rather than arbitrarily.
How does advising governments differ from being accountable to Parliament and the Prime Minister yourself?
As a registered lobbyist advising government, I find myself largely in the role of educator – providing to decision makers information that it is important for them to consider – whether it is a change of policy or the capabilities of a particular defence system. Being accountable to Parliament and to the Prime Minister is a very public form of accountability with the media sometimes serving as judge and jury. The vast majority of lobbyists, in my view, hold themselves accountable for the information they provide as a matter of reputational integrity. If a lobbyist provides false or misleading information to a public official, it doesn’t take long in a city like Ottawa for that person’s credibility to be questioned with all the negative ramifications that follow. In both instances, failure to be accountable can be a very career-limiting move.
What do clients today most underestimate about how government decision-making really works?
Some clients probably underestimate the extent to which the system is overly bureaucratic. This means that processes have been put in place that prolong decision-making with mechanisms that seek “perfect accountability.” No bureaucrat or politician wishes to be called out for financial mismanagement or malfeasance, but often the delays in decision-making create other problems as big or bigger than the problems the process was trying to address. In many instances, the “perfect” is the enemy of the “good enough” when it comes to policy and decision making.
Defence Policy and Strategic Readiness
As a former cabinet member responsible for National Defence, how do you assess the state of readiness of the Canadian Forces today compared to the early 2000s?
This is a complex question. While it is not a perfect measurement, the percentage of GDP spent on defence is typically a pretty reliable indicator of readiness if the money is budgeted properly. In the early 2000s, Canada was spending about 1.1 % of GDP on defence. Pre-Carney, our expenditures were at 1.37 % of GDP, but are expected to rise to 2% in this 2025-26 fiscal year. So by that measure, one could probably say that we are in a slightly better position today than we were in the early 2000s. However, if we look at the aging platforms the Canadian Armed Forces is currently saddled with, old frigates, old submarines and old warplanes, one could easily make the argument that we were in a better position in terms of readiness in the early 2000s. Overall, the business of defence readiness has also gotten much more complicated and more expensive with today’s information technology and the emphasis on information superiority.
What lessons from the “Facing Our Responsibilities” report remain relevant—and which were misunderstood?
The key recommendations in that report, which I chaired, included increasing the defence budget to 1.5-1.6% of GDP (from roughly 1.1%), acquiring replenishment ships, heavy-lift aircraft, and new maritime helicopters, upgrading frigates and Aurora aircraft, implementing readiness measurements, restructuring the Reserves, providing job protection for Reservists, studying special forces needs, reviewing our intelligence capabilities, improving NORAD cooperation, and funding programs for operational stress injuries. If any specific recommendation was misunderstood, it might have been the one regarding the GDP recommendation. This recommendation was based on the political reality that we were not going to be able to double our defence budget to hit 2% in the time of one Parliament – hence the stepwise approach. Most of the recommendations contained in the report have been or are in the process of being implemented even if it has taken almost 25 years to get some of these accomplished. Some, such as the replenishment ships and the Aurora replacement, are regrettably still in process. Some were implemented quickly, others took time. But for some items such as replenishment ships and the Aurora replacement, we are still waiting for delivery after almost 25 years.
Has Canada resolved the structural gap between defence ambitions and procurement realities?
The short answer is “no”, but hopefully progress will be made with the new Defence Industrial Strategy and the new Defence Investment Agency.
How should middle powers think about defence readiness in an era of persistent but diffuse threats?
Countries like Canada need to focus on defence readiness within the context of alliance responsibilities. NATO, after many years of prodding by US presidents and NATO secretary generals, is finally recognizing that Euro-Atlantic security depends on everyone investing their fair share in support of the common security goals and maintaining effective deterrence. Readiness also requires a willingness to innovate in the face of new threats, and to cooperate and coordinate responses. Allied solidarity is bolstered by burden sharing and is an important component of psychological readiness.
Procurement, Industry, and the State
How can governments balance strategic autonomy with reliance on private defence and aerospace firms?
With the exception of the United States, achieving perfect strategic autonomy is probably not possible. And to the extent that the US has from time to time (post 9-11) relied on support from allies, even it lacks perfect strategic autonomy. Private sector defence firms play an important role as partners to government in defence and security – a fact that the Carney Government seems to understand. Do we as a country wish to ensure that we are not held hostage by one country’s defence companies? Absolutely, but diversifying our supplier relationship with the US after 85 years of cooperation and partnership is not an easy proposition.
Human Security, Military Power, and Policy
Your work has consistently engaged with the concept of human security. Has that framework survived today’s return to hard power?
Hard power has definitely risen in importance in recent years with the revanchism of Russia and China, and the territorial ambitions of the Trump Administration. Many countries have lost faith in the United Nations and in the “rules based international order.” The concept of human security, while under stress, is not going away. It has its foundation the Geneva Conventions and other treaties and agreements which seek to put rules around the conduct of war. These treaties represent the basis of modern international humanitarian law regarding the treatment of soldiers and civilians during war. The Geneva Conventions of 1949 are the only international instrument which has universal application since all 196 countries are signatories including the Holy See, Palestine and the Cook Islands. And while the hegemons may pay lip service to human security and international humanitarian law, it will be up to middle and smaller powers to press for adherence to international norms and the rule of law.
Democracy Under Strain: Iraq and Beyond
Your work with the Iraqi Parliament took place under extreme conditions. What did that experience teach you about democratic capacity-building?
Democratic capacity building is exceptionally difficult in some countries due to a complex interplay of various factors. These include embedded authoritarian legacies, corruption, tribal and sectional loyalties, deep-seated economic insecurity, and weak institutional foundations. Even though reasonably fair elections can be conducted, the transition from elections to a functioning, stable democracy can be a very difficult one. Failure to make the transition can start a downward spiral that ends in political violence.
What are the most common mistakes external actors make when trying to support democratic institutions?
Probably one of the common mistakes made by external actors in trying to support democratic institutions is understanding where a particular body politic and its key players are on the continuum from authoritarianism to democracy. Misjudgments in this area can cause an entire program of democratization to fail.Part of the solution, in my view, is ensuring that the democratic practitioners have a strong understanding the history and culture of the country they are attempting to support.
Humanitarian Governance and the Red Cross
As Special Advisor to the Canadian Red Cross, you worked on clarifying its role as “Auxiliary to Government.” Why is that relationship so often misunderstood?
Most people (governments included) view the Red Cross as “just another NGO.” But the Red Cross is arguably not another NGO. When the International Committee of the Red Cross was created by the First Geneva Convention of 1864, it was intended to be auxiliary to the medical services of armed forces. In 1906, the international community revised the 1864 Geneva Convention, so that national Red Cross societies became auxiliaries to their respective national armed forces in times of war. The modern understanding of this role—a “specific and distinctive partnership” in the humanitarian field—is anchored in the 1949 Geneva Conventions (Article 26) and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. This role provides for Red Cross and Red Crescent societies to work very closely with governments in addressing humanitarian needs, but at the same time to be completely independent of those same governments. I have felt for many years that the Red Cross is an under-utilized humanitarian asset that could be doing so much more in areas such as disaster response and emergency preparedness.
How can humanitarian organisations maintain neutrality while engaging closely with the state?
This has become a thorny question for many humanitarian organizations which operate in often highly charged political environments. These organizations, while not the Red Cross, would do well to emulate the seven fundamental principles of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. Some such as Medicins Sans Frontieres do a very good job maintaining neutrality. They seven fundamental principles are:
Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service, Unity, and Universality guide all humanitarian actions. Adopted in 1965, these core ethical and operational guidelines ensure immediate, non-discriminatory aid for victims of conflict, disasters, and emergencies.
The Honourable David Pratt is Principal of David Pratt & Associates, a government relations and strategic consultancy firm located in Ottawa which he founded 14 years ago. Mr. Pratt was an elected representative at the municipal, regional and federal levels for 16 years.
First elected to the House of Commons in 1997, he was Chair of the Standing Committee on National Defence and Veterans Affairs from 2001 to 2003. He also served two foreign ministers as a Special Envoy to Sierra Leone during the rebel war and was the Honorary Consul for Sierra Leone for 10 years. He became Canada’s 36th Minister of National Defence in 2003 in the Government of Prime Minister Paul Martin. As Minister, he initiated several major procurements.
After politics, he spent four years as a Special Advisor to the Secretary General of the Canadian Red Cross where his focus was improving relations between the Red Cross and all levels of government. He wrote two major reports on the role of the Red Cross as “Auxiliary to Government” and helped draft legislation to renew the mandate of the organization.
After his work with the Red Cross, he became an independent consultant and spent five months in Baghdad, Iraq as a Senior Parliamentary Expert with the USAID sponsored Iraq Legislative Strengthening Program – the largest legislative capacity building project in the world. Mr. Pratt has written scholarly papers, newspaper articles and lectured on a variety of subjects including grand strategy, Canada’s Army Reserves, democracy promotion, foreign intelligence, Canada-US interoperability and emergency preparedness.
In 2014, he was inducted as a Knight in the Order of St. George. In 2018, he participated in the prestigious Oxford Union debates at Oxford University and in 2022 and 2023, he completed his first two triathlons.
