The WTO at a Crossroads: Power, Development, and the Future of Global Trade

Featuring – Mzukisi Qobo, South Africa’s Ambassador to the World Trade Organization and former Chair of the WTO Committee on Trade and Development.

At a moment when the global trading system is under unprecedented strain, the future of the World Trade Organization (WTO) has become a litmus test for whether multilateral cooperation can still function in an era of fragmentation. Disrupted supply chains, aggressive industrial policy, geopolitical rivalry, and uneven post-pandemic recovery have exposed deep structural fault lines in global trade governance—particularly for developing economies.

In this conversation with Danish Shaikh, Editor at The International Wire, Mzukisi Qobo, South Africa’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the WTO, offers a rare insider perspective on an institution widely—and often prematurely—declared to be in decline. Rather than framing the WTO as irrelevant, Qobo argues that its core strength—consensus-based decision-making—has become its most misunderstood constraint in a world increasingly driven by speed, unilateralism, and power politics.

The discussion ranges from the absence of multilateral rules on digital trade, to the growing tension between industrial policy and global trade disciplines, and Africa’s persistent struggle to secure meaningful agency within global value chains. Instead of proposing quick fixes, Qobo situates WTO reform within a deeper political economy of development, state capacity, and cooperation—contending that development must be treated as a lived outcome, not a rhetorical promise.

This is not a conversation about procedural reform alone. It is a reflection on power, fairness, and whether global trade rules can still serve development in a fractured world.

Multilateral Trade in a Fractured World

You represent South Africa at the World Trade Organization at a moment of profound stress for the multilateral system. What do you see as the WTO’s most misunderstood constraint today?

The decision-making process is based on consensus, a positive quality that ensures every country has an equal weight in shaping the negotiating agenda of the WTO and other institutional processes. This particularly protects developing countries and least developed countries against the use of might. Another dimension of consensus, however, is the fact that for the organisation to take any decision or agree on a negotiating approach, every member – and there are 166 members with varying interests and priorities – has to lend consensus. In a rapidly changing global environment and where the organisation needs to be more responsive and agile, consensus-based decision-making could seem like a constraint for others. This tension calls for members to be more creative in building convergence, introducing deadlock-breaking mechanism, and finding points of connection that could help smooth decision-making without eroding the value and quality of consensus-based decision-making. If we are able to do this, we could very well succeed in making the WTO more agile and effective in taking decisions.

Is the current crisis of the WTO primarily one of rules, leadership, or political will among its members?

I think it is all of these factors. Regarding the rules, there is a sense among some members that the rules are no longer aligned with demands of global commerce and the emergence of new features across global supply chains. For example, digitally-delivered services as a component of services have been growing faster than the traditional services, and certainly much faster than the goods sector. Much of what goes into production today, and the value of what is traded, is predominantly made up of intangible goods, including research and design, intellectual property, branding – processes that require knowledge-intensity. Although total world trade in goods and services have grown fivefold since the establishment of the WTO in 1995, services generally have grown faster than goods, roughly at 7% on annualised basis compared to just over 5% growth in goods trade. More recently there has been quadrupling of value of digitally delivered services exports, representing over half of total services exports. Yet, there is no rulemaking in this burgeoning sector of the economy and over which many firms globally have a growing interest. From the rules point of view, there is validity in the point made by some members that the rule-book is outdated as it is unable to define terms of engagement multilaterally on digital trade. Members have to think about this. This also goes for new developments related to artificial intelligence, green technologies and other new issues. The subsidies toolbox has not been seriously revisited since 1995 despite the fact that many countries are deploying subsidies in new sectors to bolster security and promote industrial competitiveness and resilience. A key tension point is the failure of the WTO to respond effectively to challenges experienced by the majority of its members who are developing and who are calling for flexibility and policy space to enable them to address developmental deficits including overcoming commodity dependence and diversifying their economies. So, rule-making is a major point of contention. Since the WTO is a member-driven organisation, every country has the responsibility to demonstrate leadership, to search for the art of the possible in negotiating constraints and managing trade-offs. All of this will require political will and understanding that the WTO is an avenue of opportunity to facilitate global growth and reinforce the wheels of global commerce.

As debates around reform intensify, which elements of the WTO’s original design still hold, and which require fundamental rethinking?

The foundational principles of the Marrakesh Agreement which are set out in its pre-amble, for example, that members should take positive step to support development, the consensus-based decision-making, and the principle of non-discrimination or most-favoured nations are all essential principles as are the processes that subject members to periodic trade policy review mechanism. Apart from addressing some of the longstanding challenges, including yielding development outcomes – more so given the developmental pressures disproportionately faced by developing countries today – it is important that members commit to renewing the organisation, making it more responsive to multiple challenges facing global commerce, and preparing for an increasingly uncertain future. In a word, the organisation must be reformed for greater relevance. This will require taking a closer look at how we align or negotiate on a canvass marked by divergent interests and positions, how we build a compact of shared commitments to delivering public goods, and how we respond to the needs of the most vulnerable members. Galvanising the negotiating mandate, reforming dispute resolution mechanism and enhancing the deliberative function, which entails learning, self-discovery, best practice sharing, and exchange of view are all going to be important in thinking about the future of the organisation.

How should developing countries frame their interests in WTO reform without being caught between great-power rivalry?

Developing countries continue to assert their interests beyond great-power rivalry. They have made very clear submissions on the need to implement special and differential treatment, which is a treaty-embedded right, across the different WTO agreements. They have also underscored the importance of policy space for industrialisation, especially when one considers that developed countries simply assume policy space behind national security provisions and other protective measures. Developed countries are among the leading users of trade-distorting subsidies in agriculture and deployment of support measures in new sectors. Yet most developing countries do not have similar capabilities, and require institutional protection through a multilaterally secured latitude to utilise policy space to advance their industrialisation. Many of these countries, especially on the African continent, are commodity dependent while technology assets, including those aimed at enabling climate mitigation, are concentrated largely among developed countries. The distribution of capabilities is still asymmetric, with many of the developing and middle-income countries facing premature de-industrialisation. While some of the answers to these questions entail domestic institutions and reform measures, there is a greater role that the WTO can play in supporting developing countries to close the gap.

Trade, Development & African Agency

Having chaired the WTO Committee on Trade and Development, how do you assess the credibility of development as a lived principle rather than a rhetorical commitment?

To be fair, there has been much work done by various development partners, mostly from developed countries, through their bilateral contributions, including in trust funds, WTO Institute for Training and Technical Capacity, trade facilitation support, women exporters in the digital economy, and other capacity building initiatives. The institution needs more of this support. These enablers are important for helping developing members undertake training and other institutional capacity related processes. Yet still, the WTO is falling short of meeting the ideal of the Marrakesh Agreement as many countries struggle to capture a growing share of global trade and their integration into global value chains remains weak. Overall, there is a commitment by various members who have come forward with positive proposals on how to advance the development work of the WTO. We have an opportunity to turn much of this from rhetoric to practice.

Do you believe special and differential treatment still serves developing economies—or does it need recalibration?

This is very important for developing countries. The instrument has suffered from lack of precise and effective implementation rather than because it has no takers. The ongoing discussions on reform has a component of this, and hopefully we can arrive at something that could lend itself to more precise and effective implementation.

From an African perspective, what does meaningful participation in global trade governance actually look like?

It means really several things. At the core, it is about capabilities. Amartya Sen often framed development as the process of overcoming unfreedoms, and this is grounded in the idea that freedom is development. Essentially, this notion is about the expansion of capabilities: what countries and people are actually able to do and to become. It is a conception that has a clear Aristotelian lineage, especially Aristotle’s insight that freedom must be instrumental, enabling people to live well rather than existing merely in formal terms.

It also resonates with Isaiah Berlin’s distinction between negative and positive freedom. In a negative sense, freedom can be constrained by external limits, for example, rules, disciplines, or asymmetries that inhibit its effective expression. Positive freedom, by contrast, speaks to autonomy and self-realisation, that is, the ability to shape one’s own path. Applied to global trade governance, the question is whether the rules and processes we design reduce unfreedoms or entrench them, whether they enable developing countries to participate meaningfully in decision-making and to transform their productive structures, or whether they narrow policy space in ways that lock in existing inequalities and lopsided global structure of production and trade. As I noted earlier, part of the answer undoubtedly lies in domestic and regional action. However, the multilateral trading system is not an island; it ought to respond to development deficits as one of the biggest challenges humanity faces today. So, the WTO must be attentive to development realities and that is not the same as making it a development organisation. If it responds to climate challenges through trade rules that does not all of a sudden turn the WTO into an environmental organisation. Crucially, it must avoid throttling development prospects through excessive stringency, particularly where well-calibrated flexibilities are warranted by levels of development and by persistent global inequities. In short, meaningful participation means not only having a seat at the table, but having the capability to shape outcomes in ways that advance structural transformation and long-term development.

How can African economies strengthen their agency within global value chains without retreating into protectionism?

African economies have a window of opportunity today more so in light of the African Continental Free Trade Area, which cuts across several dimensions – goods trade, services, digital trade, and investment. It is still early days but it promises to provide an environment in which African countries can develop their productive capabilities and expand intra-regional trade, including on value added goods, and push Africa’s share of global trade above the current 3%. The demographics favour the continent with its market of over 1.2 billion people, and touted as a new frontier of growth with a youthful population. Another avenue of opportunity is that of capitalising on abundance of critical minerals to forge strong cross-border cooperation on value addition and more beneficial integration into global value chains especially for green technologies. It is limiting to think of support measures through the prism of old-style protectionism. Industrial policy today is no longer confined, for example, to just infant industry protection or sectoral support – although this might be needed at times depending on the context. Industrial policies have a far more expansive utility for pursuing strategic autonomy, resilience, national security, climate objectives, digital services, and technological leadership. There is no reason African countries cannot develop such capabilities. I think we are in a global climate where commercial diplomacy, market diversification, and strategic alliance formation are going to be the main drivers of industrial competitiveness and resilience, and Africa is primed to seize these advantages. This has to be balanced with building diplomatic bridges across diverse set of countries and regions.

Political Economy & Strategy

Your work consistently bridges political economy and strategy. Why is this integration still absent in much trade policymaking?

I can only say that both political economy and strategy are essential. I consider myself fortunate to have been trained in international political economy. I still have gaps in understanding all the minutiae of trade rules. WTO is a very technical universe. It is clear to me that the WTO is not an island apart from the world; it has to grapple with global challenges or at least make a contribution to solving those challenges if it is to be relevant. What it does should be relations to what ordinary people, workers, and firms are grappling with. It has to generate quality of live outcomes for economies. Strategy is also about grasping the importance of dealing both with short-term and long-term issues, showing flexibility in negotiations so that there is some movement in tackling some of the difficult issues, and cultivating common purpose in shaping the institution for the long-term. At times one has to hold contradictory positions at once, listen to others, enrich one’s perspectives, and identify key moments for trade-offs that are mutually beneficial while at the same time seeking to secure your country’s most valuable interests. What this also means is that relations among ourselves as members should not be fixed in an adversarial posture, but work across the spectrum to identify shared interests.

How should states think about trade policy when economic security and resilience are now central concerns?

Trade policy, economic security and resilience are not mutually exclusive. That the era we live in is marked by growing emphasis on economic security and resilience among major powers underscores the importance of strengthened global cooperation and innovative rule-making. It is worth noting that trade rules are important yet flexibilities should not be seen as a taboo especially for legitimate public policy action. The major worry today is that of negative spillover effects of industrial policy and national security measures affecting global supply chains, undertaken largely by powerful countries. There is also concern over restrictions at the chokepoints of global supply chains especially given the role of advanced technologies in geopolitics and trade. These are issues WTO members should talk about so that there is fairness in global trade. For states, trade policy cannot be thought of in narrow terms, since the global economy encompasses a much more complex dynamic and wider universe of economic security, rise in digital electronics and AI in global value chains, and the deepening trade and environment nexus. Trade policy has to be viewed as part of the broader dimension of statecraft and economic diplomacy.

Is the return of industrial policy compatible with multilateral trade rules or does it mark a structural shift away from them?

As noted above, what we should be more concerned with are the cross-border negative effects of industrial policy measures. Such an assessment should be empirical and evidence-based to limit the noise. Data and evidence will also help in intermediating between anecdotes about non-market practices versus net-welfare effects generated by productivity gains and innovation drive that the world may not have been fully prepared for. We’ve got to target the problem accurately rather than act on ideological reflexes.

Institutions, Capability & the State

Before diplomacy, you led the Wits School of Governance. How does academic leadership shape your approach to multilateral negotiation?

As an academic you are oriented towards understanding varying perspective and engage with the evidence. When challenged with better argument or evidence, you have to reassess your assumptions. My academic leadership role equipped me to approach my work with a high sense of responsibility and stewardship. I am obsessed with questions about how do positions I articulate relate to the country’s broader economic realities and government priorities? How can I use this position to cast South Africa in a positive light and advance positions that are more aligned with the strategic intent of my government? And what additionality can I bring to my work to bring more gains to South Africa while also supporting the WTO as an institution since we are its constituent as members.

Policy Experience & Advisory Roles

Serving on South Africa’s Presidential Economic Advisory Council during a turbulent period, what did you learn about the limits of expert advice?

Expert advice helps decision-makers choose from a menu of options. It is never meant to be decisive. Being an advisor to the President is huge privilege, learning both from the art of statecraft and the talented peers on the advisory council.

The Agriculture and Agro-processing Masterplan required coordination across state and private actors. What lessons does it offer for future industrial strategies?

Public policy strategies benefit from co-creation among a wide range of actors, especially government, industry, labour, and experts

Ideas & Legacy

How does writing and editing shape your thinking differently from diplomacy or policy work?

Writing and editing helps me to reflect and clarify my thoughts and values. It is about self-discovery. This also affords me an opportunity to take a step back from the frenetic nature of work, especially trade negotiations to think broadly about the world, how the work I do fits into the world, and what my place in the world is. Importantly, it enables me to strive to be human.

Looking ahead, what institutional reform global or national do you believe will matter most for the next generation of African leaders?

I think global cooperation will matter a lot generally. This includes cooperation on international trade, finance, environment, and AI and emerging technologies. The cost of the absence of international cooperation is breakdown in human relations, proliferation of hatred, philistinism, ambivalence to the pain of others, conflicts, and personal crises mentally and emotionally. It also erodes the material and social capital of future generations.

Rapid-Fire

Multilateralism or plurilateralism?

Both. These are both important. The Marrakesh Agreement allows for plurilaterals; it is their incorporation to the legal architecture that has to find a pathway through consensus.

Trade liberalisation or strategic autonomy?

Both. Countries need strategic autonomy to reinforce their competitiveness and resilience, yet trade is essential.

Rules or discretion?

Both. We need rules with flexibility given the reality of uneven development, and that many developing and African countries are still battling to recover to pre-pandemic levels compared to developed countries. The current global trade turbulence affect developing countries disproportionately.

Development first or competitiveness first?

Both. Development is about building capabilities, and competitiveness is about transforming and sustaining them.

Globalisation reformed or globalisation reversed?

Globalisation.

Diplomacy or scholarship?

Both. Scholarship plays an important role in providing insights for diplomacy.Diplomacy is an important value on its own – to build bridges, to become a better person through listening to and learning from others, and enriching humanity.

Consensus or principled disagreement?

Both. Consensus is an expression of common ground on certain areas, principled disagreement is important when you have reached the end of the road – although the art of diplomacy is about fine-tuning, building convergence, seeking a third way, and transforming conversations.

Digital trade: opportunity or asymmetry?

Opportunity

Leadership is about vision or execution?

Both, although execution is a more essential quality.

One word that best defines the future of global trade governance.

Global trade is an unstoppable force, and a reflection of growth in productive capabilities, an urge for human connection and international relations, and a vital source of growth and prosperity. It is up to us to shape its course for the benefit of today and future generation while showing sensitivity to sustainability and development.

Ambassador Mzukisi Qobo – Ambassador and Permanent Representative of South Africa to the World Trade Organisation

Ambassador Mzukisi Qobo is a diplomat, political economist, and author, currently serving as South Africa’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the World Trade Organization (WTO), where he represents the country in multilateral trade negotiations and contributes to discussions on WTO reform. He has also served as Chair of the WTO Committee on Trade and Development and Chair of the International Trade Centre’s Joint Advisory Group.

Previously, he was Head of School at the Wits School of Governance, leading initiatives on digital government, state capability, and public-sector leadership, and earlier an Associate Professor of Strategy and International Business at Wits Business School. His public-policy experience includes serving on the Presidential Economic Advisory Council (2019–2024), leading the Agriculture and Agro-processing Masterplan, and holding senior responsibility for trade policy.

He has advised organisations such as the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa and the World Bank, served on boards in development finance and philanthropy, and supports education and leadership development through the Qobo Foundation. He holds a PhD from the University of Warwick, is the author of The Political Economy of China–US Relations: African Agency and the Digital Future, and is a Visiting Professor at the Wits School of Governance.

When Technology Becomes Statecraft: Governing in the Intelligent Age